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Every inference is dependent upon a generalization. The inductive
form of an inference can be converted to a quasi-deductive form by
identifying and articulating the generalization upon which it depends.
Thus, classically, Descartes', "I think; therefore I am" depends upon the
generalization that might be formally stated as "all persons who think
are persons who exist" and converted to a syllogistic form:
All persons who think are persons who exist.
I am a person who thinks.
Therefore, I am a person who exists.'
* Professor, University of Miami School of Law. This essay is a part of a larger work in
progress. The year that I spent as a Fellow at the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study
(1994/95) afforded me the time to begin my work on generalizations in legal and non-legal con-
texts. The ideas developed here were first presented at the Seventy-Fifth Anniversary Sympo-
sium on The Science of Proof hosted and sponsored by the South Texas College of Law. I am
indebted to those who attended and participated in that symposium. I am specially indebted to
William Twining and David Schum, who have provoked and critiqued my thinking about evi-
dential and inferential issues for almost two decades, and to Carolyn Bugh and Erica Beecher-
Monas whose detailed critiques of earlier drafts significantly contributed to the final project. I
am also indebted to a generation of students who suffered through my course on Analysis of
Evidence and have done detailed analyses of complex masses of evidence that have reinforced
my view that the kind of analysis suggested here can generate important and useful insights.
1. Or, to parallel Descartes' elegant simplicity: All who think are; I think; therefore, I
am.
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In most contexts, inductive reasoning operates intuitively. The rea-
soner does not consciously identify the generalizations upon which her
inferences depend, unless she is required to justify her conclusions.
Even then, she will often find it hard, probably impossible, to articulate
the precise generalization upon which an inference relied, as opposed to
articulating an after-the-fact generalization that she believes justifies her
conclusion. For example, I might assert, "Dave Schum spoke with Wil-
liam Twining last Tuesday." If asked how I knew that, I might respond,
"Because Twining told me so." Unless challenged, I would not think
about or explain my reason for thinking that Twining's statement justi-
fied my conclusion. If challenged, I might have difficulty specifying the
generalization that motivated my conclusion, but I might suggest my
conclusion was justified because, "Based upon my experience with
Twining, I believe Twining's reports of past events are almost always ac-
curate."'
The relationships between generalizations and proof and generali-
zations and ethnocentricity have been developed and debated by oth-
ers.3 Those analyses have, for the most part, worked from the top down;
that is, they have developed concepts at various levels of theorizing,'
using generalized, rather than context-specific, illustrations, such as
gatecrashers at the rodeo,5 blue buses,6 and prisoners in the yard.7 A few
2. I have not had as much experience with Peter Murphy, so if my report was that Peter
Murphy told me that Twining had spoken with Schum on Tuesday, I might justify my conclu-
sion in two steps by saying: (1) "Based upon my experience, law professors are responsible
adults. Peter Murphy is a law professor. Therefore, Peter Murphy is a responsible adult." (2)
"In almost all circumstances, responsible adults report events accurately and truthfully. Peter
Murphy is a responsible adult. Therefore, Peter Murphy's report was almost certainly accurate
and truthful."
3. The focus upon the relationship between generalizations and proof has been ex-
plicit in the "probabilities debate." See generally Symposium, Decision and Inference in
Litigation, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 253-1079 (1991) [hereinafter Decision and Inference] (in-
cluding contributions from many of the principals in debate); see also DAVID A. SCHUM,
PROBABILISTIC FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENTIAL REASONING (1994) (comprehensive
summary and analysis). The focus in other areas has ordinarily been implicit. See, e.g.,
MARY FIELD BELENKY, ET AL., WOMEN'S WAYS OF KNOWING (1986); SUSAN J.
HEKMAN, GENDER AND KNOWLEDGE (1990) (developing claims that there are ways of
knowing unique to women); compare SUSAN HAACK, MANIFESTO OF A PASSIONATE
MODERATE (1998) (rejecting claims).
4. WILLIAM TWINING, RETHINKING EVIDENCE 343-45 (1990) [hereinafter
RETHINKING] (on levels of theorizing).
5. L. JONATHAN COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE 74-76 (1977) [herein-
after COHEN] (paradox of gatecrashers); cf. RETHINKING, supra note 4, at 362-63 (critique).
6. The "blue bus" hypothetical was adapted from Smith v. Rapid Transit, Inc., 58
N.E.2d 754 (Mass. 1945) and has been accepted as a "probabilities chestnut" since Professor
Tribe first posed it in 1971. See Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual
in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1340-41 (1971). See, e.g., TERENCE ANDERSON
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theorists have combined "top-down" and "bottom-up" analysis in de-
tailed analyses that use a complex, defined body of evidentiary material
as the basis for illustrating and analyzing problems at a theoretical level.8
Those efforts have necessarily identified synthetic-intuitive generaliza-
tions of the kind described here and analyzed the roles they played or
may have played in the context of the specific case.9
This essay is a preliminary exploration and the first in a planned se-
ries of explorations of the roles generalizations play in different contexts,
legal and other." The present essay defines two kinds of generaliza-
tions-"synthetic-intuitive" generalizations and "context-specific" gen-
eralizations-and discusses the relationships between the two in rea-
soning and justification. It also describes and illustrates a method of
analysis, a "generalization" method of analysis. A central thesis of the
essay is that identifying, classifying, and articulating the generalizations
offered as justifying or necessary to justify specific inferences are useful
devices for understanding, constructing, clarifying, and criticizing argu-
ments. This is a device that provides a lens for analyzing problems of
proof and justification and a method of analysis that generates insights
that are not otherwise apparent."
& WILLIAM TWINING, ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE 436 (1991) [hereinafter ANALYSIS] (variant
posed); RETHINKING, supra note 4, at 209, 363, 365 (critique).
7. Charles R. Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and Permissive Inferences: The Value of Com-
plexity, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1187, 1192-94 (1979).
& See, e.g., JOSEPH B. KADANE & DAVID A. SCHUM, A PROBABALISTIC ANALYSIS
OF THE SACCO AND VANZETr EVIDENCE (1996). See also Anatomy of a Cause Celdbre: The
Case of Edith Thompson in RETHINKING, supra note 4, at 262-307; Thompson and Wigmore:
Fresh Evidence and New Perspectives in RETHINKING, supra note 4, at 308-31 (analyzing the
evidence from THE TRIAL OF FREDERICK BYWATERS AND EDITH THOMPSON (Filson
Young ed., reprint 1951) (1923) and discussing other analyses).
9. See, e.g., RETHINKING, supra note 4, at 282-88 (generalizations and arguments in Rex
v. Bywaters, 17 Crim. App. 66 (U.K. 1922) about the inferences to be drawn from the fact that
Frederick Bywaters, a defendant, was carrying a knife at the time he encountered and stabbed
Percy Thompson, the victim and the husband of Edith Thompson, the co-defendant).
10. I use "generalization" to denote any proposition that can be framed as a premise and
used in a logical argument to show that a claim of any kind is justified or warranted to some
degree, be it a claim of fact, a claim of value, a claim of policy, or a hybrid claim. Although the
present essay focuses upon uses of generalizations in justifying inferences from factual data, it
is the broader definition that makes it possible to apply the method of analysis described here
in other, non-factual contexts.
11. This essay focuses upon the uses and limitations of generalization-analysis as an heu-
ristic device, as an aid to analysis, and the roles that the two classes of generalizations may play
in reasoning about factual propositions and in justifying arguments and conclusions. The pres-
ent essay does not attempt to present a comprehensive theory of generalizations, nor does it
seek to revisit or revise the extended analyses of generalizations that have been developed in
the probabilities debates that gave rise to what has been called the "New Evidence Scholar-
ship." See generally Decision and Inference, supra note 3 (for examples); see also,
RETHINKING, supra note 4, at 341-42, 349-52 (describing and critiquing the debates). The
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Part I sets the framework: I discuss the nature and functions of gen-
eralizations, as I define the term, to establish a foundation. As part of
that foundation, I define and describe the two overlapping categories of
generalizations- "synthetic-intuitive" generalizations and "context-
specific" generalizations -that are central to my thesis. Against that
background, I describe a method of generalization-analysis and suggest
a four-step protocol for its use. In Part II, I apply the method and illus-
trate the roles of the two kinds of generalizations in the context of a de-
cided case, the Supreme Court's decision in Huddleston v. United
States,2 to illustrate the kinds of not-otherwise-apparent issues the
method can reveal. In a concluding note, I set this essay in the context
of my broader project.
I. GENERALIZATION-ANALYSIS: SOME CONCEPTS AND A
PROTOCOL
A. Some Concepts
In one view, all knowledge is based upon the ability to generalize
and upon generalizations. Children, for example, learn language by
generalizing from specific instances-e.g., from hearing different objects
that they see classified as a "chair," they generalize a concept of the
characteristics of objects that fall within the class described by the word
"chair," or from repetitive usage of more abstract terms, such as "good"
and "bad," they generalize a concept defining an open-ended class.
Adults learn by generalizing from experience, by assimilating the ethno-
centric values and prejudices that define the groups of which they are a
part, by generalizing from controlled observations, and by generalizing
from third-party sources such as books.
1 3
Generalizations can be categorized in different ways for different
purposes. In the context of arguments about questions of fact,14 it is use-
ful to categorize them in terms of source and reliability. For most pur-
poses, five overlapping categories are adequate to classify generaliza-
tions by source -scientific generalizations, expert generalizations,
method presented here does, however, provide a lens for analyzing problems of proof and jus-
tification and a framework that may make it possible to refocus those debates.
12. 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
13. See, e.g., WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, WORD AND OBJECr (1960) (developing
the foundation for this view).
14. I have also concluded that generalization-analysis can be applied to arguments about




general knowledge generalizations, experience-based generalizations,
and belief generalizations.15 Generalizations can also be classified on a
spectrum of reliability ranging from well-tested and generally accepted
propositions, such as those associated with the law of gravity, to largely
untested and sometimes untestable intuitions, such as the generaliza-
tions upon which the view that flight from the scene of a crime is evi-
dence of guilt is based, to unfounded biases based upon prejudice or
false stereotypes, such as the generalization that women cannot be effec-
tive lawyers that was widely accepted in prior generations. 6
Many generalizations in any of these categories can be usefully
categorized as "synthetic-intuitive" generalizations and as "context-
specific" generalizations. "Synthetic-intuitive" generalizations, as I de-
fine the class, are generalizations that a person synthesizes or intuits
from her stock of knowledge and beliefs. Sometimes an individual can
explain the sources from which she synthesized the generalization. Fre-
quently, however, the intuitive predominates-the individual cannot
identify the source of the generalization or explain why she believes that
it is sound.7
The generalizations necessary to support the inferences that flight
from the scene of a crime is evidence of guilt are examples of "synthetic-
intuitive" generalizations. I am unaware of any tests that claim to have
verified these generalizations. Nonetheless, the generalization "persons
who have committed a crime often flee from the scene of that crime"
seems intuitively right. In its weakest form,8 I would accept the trans-
15. The five categories are defined and their roles are discussed in ANALYSIS, supra note
6, at 368-69. The Supreme Court's decision in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 119 S. Ct. 1167
(1999), may require some further amplification on the distinctions and similarities between sci-
entific and expert generalizations.
16. See, e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872) (affirming decision by Illinois Su-
preme Court that women could not be admitted to the bar), especially 141-42 ("The para-
mount destiny and mission of women are to fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife and
mother. This is the law of the Creator. And the rules of civil society must be adapted to
the general constitution of things, and cannot be based upon exceptional cases.") (Bradley,
J., concurring).
17. The nature of a claim that a generalization is "sound" or "well-founded" or
"grounded" is itself a complex subject. See generally William Twining, Narrative and Gen-
eralizations in Argumentation About Questions of Fact, 40 S. TEX. L. REV. 351 (1999) (for
a discussion); see also WILLEM A. WAGENAAR, PETER J. VAN KOPPEN, AND HANS F.M.
CROMBAG, ANCHORED NARRATIVES (1993) (perspective and theory developed by Dutch
psychologists examining Netherlands criminal justice system).
18. There are different senses in which the term "weakest" can be applied to synthetic-
intuitive generalizations (and to context-specific generalizations). A generalization may be
weak in the sense that it supplies only weak support for an inference in that the quantifier is
weak. A generalization may also be weak in the sense that the individual applying it may doubt
its soundness or may doubt the validity of her own intuition.
1999]
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posed generalization upon which flight inferences depend, "persons who
flee from the scene of a crime are sometimes persons who are guilty of
that crime." The generalization thus framed could provide only weak
support for an inference that the person seen fleeing from the scene of a
specific crime was the person who committed that crime: that person
may be the person who committed the crime.19 I can think of no basis
for my acceptance of these generalizations, apart from a synthesis or an
intuition based upon my personal "stock of knowledge" or my "common
sense."
"Context-specific" generalizations, 20 as I define the class, are gener-
alizations made as specific to the precise inference in question as is nec-
essary to make the argument explicit a way in which it can be analyzed
and appraised.2 For example, a synthetic-intuitive flight generalization
might be converted into a context-specific generalization by asking: Was
the fact that this particular accused left this particular crime scene hur-
riedly and went to that particular place evidence that this accused had a
guilty state of mind about the particular crime charged?
By way of further illustration, I would also accept, intuitively, the
abstract generalization that "goods supplied by someone who has sup-
plied stolen goods on other occasions are probably/frequently/ some-
19. If the formulation I suggest is accepted, the use of this generalization raises an issue
similar to one of the issues raised by the justification the Supreme Court used in Huddleston.
See infra Part II. In what circumstances should evidence offered as support for an inference be
admitted or excluded when the quantifying term in the generalization necessary to justify the
inference is indeterminate or insufficient to support a finding that the inference is "more prob-
able than not?" For example, should flight be admitted as evidence of guilt in cases in which a
rational fact-finder could not declare that: "It is more probable than not that persons fleeing
from a crime scene of the kind and in the circumstances similar to those established by the evi-
dence in this case are persons who are guilty of the crime committed at that scene?" The ar-
gument can be made that, if the quantifier in the generalization necessary to justify such an
inference is not at least "more probable than not," the alternative explanations for the eviden-
tial data offered must, in the aggregate, be more probable than the specific inference proffered,
giving rise to a claim that the risk of confusion, misuse, or misvaluation outweighs any legiti-
mate probative value. Cf ANALYSIS, supra note 6 at 358-63 (illustrating an example and dis-
cussion).
20. I chose the term "context-specific," rather than "case-specific" or "situation-specific,"
because it better suggests the range of situation-types in which generalization-analysis can be
usefully employed.
21. The synthetic-intuitive generalization supporting the proffered inference may be one
of demonstrable validity, such as a proven scientific generalization, or it may be a generaliza-
tion based primarily upon the articulator's intention. In the latter case, the context-specific
generalization may be one derived from an identified synthetic-intuitive generalization or the
synthetic-intuitive generalization may discovered abductively in the search for a rational basis
to support a context-specific generalization that is necessary to establish a justifying relation-
ship between the proposition to be justified, the "probandum," and the proposition offered as
support, the "probans." See ANALYSIS, supra note 6, at 54-57, 61-62 (quoting JOHN HENRY
WIGMORE, THE SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOf (1937) [hereinafter THE SCIENCE]).
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times also stolen goods." In the analyzing a case such as Huddleston, I
might convert the abstract generalization into a generalization specific to
the context of that case:
In all/most/many/some instances, a substantial quantity of goods
supplied by a person, who had on two subsequent occasions within a
three-month period supplied substantial quantities of other kinds of
goods that were in fact stolen goods, is a quantity of goods that was sto-
len.22
These concepts provide a backdrop for the method of analysis de-
scribed below.
B. The Protocol
There are four steps that facilitate an analysis of the role of gener-
alizations in specific kinds of reasoning: clarification of standpoint, speci-
fication of the proposition to be justified, specification of the proposition
or propositions offered as the basis for its justification, and identification
and articulation of the generalization or generalizations upon which the
justification depends. The first step should be completed before the
analysis begins. The other steps are often reflexive.
1. Clarification of Standpoint. The analyst must answer three ques-
tions to order to define her standpoint for any particular analysis. What
is her role in this analysis? At what stage of what process is the analysis
being done? What precisely are the purposes and objectives of the
analysis? In legal contexts, for example, the role may be that of a par-
ticipant in a legal process (e.g., client, counselor, negotiator, advocate,
judge, juror, etc.), or it may be that of an observer of that process (aca-
demic lawyer, historian, philosopher, probabalist, etc.). In other con-
texts, the possible roles will vary with the process for which the analysis
is being done. In legal and some other contexts, there are defined proc-
esses which go through specified stages. For example, a litigation proc-
ess may begin with an initial client interview and proceed through pre-
trial, trial, and post-trial stages, or a scientific investigation may move
from a hypothesis formulation stage through testing, revision, and verifi-
cation stages. The objectives may be varied, but in most instances the
possibilities are defined and limited by role and process. For example,
an advocate preparing for appeal is largely confined to data contained in
the record developed at the trial and pre-trial stages of the litigation
process.
2. Specification of the Proposition to Be Justified. The analysis re-
22. The Huddleston illustration is developed below. See infra Part II.
1999]
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quires that the proposition or propositions to be justified be identified
and articulated with precision, but the articulation may have to be made
and revised to express the proposition or propositions that can be justi-
fied in light of the available evidence and plausible generalizations.
3. Specification of the Justifying Proposition or Propositions.
Wigmore defined a proposition to be justified or proved as a "proban-
dum" and a proposition offered as support as a "probans. 23 It is impor-
tant to recognize that a proposition may be both a probandum and a
probans in a catenated argument. For example, evidential propositions,
propositions expressing evidential data-a testimonial assertion or an
item of physical evidence-may be offered to support an inferred
proposition, a probandum. That probandum ordinarily then becomes a
probans, a proposition offered as support, by itself or in combination
with other propositions, for a further inferred proposition, another pro-
bandum. Both the articulation and the function of the justifying propo-
sition must be identified with as much precision as possible.
4. Identification and Articulation of the Generalization[s] In-
volved. The processes involved in identifying and articulating synthetic-
intuitive and context-specific generalizations are discussed and illus-
trated above and below. Standpoint is critical at this stage. The analyst
must understand her standpoint in order to effectively analyze the rela-
tionship between the proposition to be justified and the propositions of-
fered as justification. In the analysis, is the proponent an advocate
seeking to justify the conclusion? Is she a decision-maker who has to
decide whether the conclusion has been established to the required de-
gree of certainty? Is she a reviewer called upon to decide whether the
conclusion should be confirmed, revised, or reversed? Is she a critic
concerned with the validity or structure of the argument or the nature
and significance of the generalizations used? The articulation or articu-
lations may vary with role and objective.
For an analysis of arguments and justifications in specific contexts,
it is necessary to identify and articulate the abstract synthetic-intuitive
generalizations and the related context-specific generalizations neces-
sary to demonstrate the logical relationships between the probans and
the probanda. The process of identification is normally reflexive. Some-
times, the analyst sees the abstract at the outset and struggle to make it
fit the context. Other times, particularly when the role is that of an ad-
vocate, she formulates the context-specific generalization and then
"searches her mind" for an abstract, synthetic-intuitive generalization
23. See THE SCIENCE, supra note 21, at §3, quoted in ANALYSIS, supra note 6, at 54-55.
24. See text accompanying notes 18-22 supra and 45-50 infra.
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upon which the context-specific generalization can be defended as plau-
sible.
These steps are necessary, but hardly sufficient. They provide the
foundation from which the analysis may proceed in light of the analyst's
standpoint. The procedure for completing the analysis varies with
standpoint and with context-points illustrated in the example that fol-
lows.
II. GENERALIZATION-ANALYSIS: THE METHOD ILLUSTRATED
A. The Decided Case: Huddleston
A federal grand jury indicted Gary Rufus Huddleston, charging
that, in April 1985, he had sold (count one) and had possessed (count
two) Memorex videocassette tapes (the "tapes") that had been stolen in
interstate commerce.' The tapes had been stolen, and Huddleston had
sold and had possessed quantities of the tapes.26 The only issue in dis-
pute was whether Huddleston knew that the tapes had been stolen at
the time he had sold or possessed them. The issue was apparently a
close one: After two days of deliberations, the jury acquitted Hud-
dleston on the charge that he had knowingly sold stolen tapes, but con-
victed him on the charge that he had knowingly possessed stolen tapes.27
According to Huddleston, Leroy Wesby had a large quantity of the
tapes, had invited Huddleston to sell them on a commission basis, and
had assured Huddleston that the tapes were legitimate.' Huddleston of-
fered and sold quantities of the tapes at prices that were below the cost
of manufacturing the tapes. Huddleston acknowledged that he had
possessed and sold substantial quantities of the tapes, but claimed that
he had no knowledge that they were stolen.3" The government sought to
introduce "similar acts" evidence concerning two other lots of goods to
support an inference that Huddleston knew that the tapes were stolen.3'
The challenged similar-act evidence that became the focus of the
Court's decision showed that, in February 1985, Huddleston had ar-
ranged a sale of thirty-eight new 12" black and white television sets (the
"TV sets"), also supplied by Wesby, to a retailer for $28 per set. Over
25. See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 682--84 (1988).
26. See id. at 682--84.




31. See id. at 683-84.
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Huddleston's objection, the trial court admitted this evidence.32 Ac-
cording to the Court, the "direct evidence" that these TV sets had been
stolen was that they had been sold at a low price; that Huddleston did
not produce a bill of sale at trial; and that, according to a witness who
had purchased thirty-eight of the TV sets, Huddleston had indicated he
could obtain several thousand more.33
The government also offered evidence that in May 1985, Hud-
dleston had offered to sell to an FBI undercover agent a large quantity
of Amana appliances that also had been supplied by Wesby. ' It was
undisputed that these appliances had been stolen.35 Huddleston testified
that he had asked and Wesby had also assured him that the TV sets and
32. See id. at 683.
33. See id. The Court asserted that, "According to Toney [the buyer of the 38 TV sets],
petitioner indicated that he could obtain several thousand of these televisions." Id. A claim
that the Court believed that this was merely a statement of the evidence viewed most favorably
to the government illustrates another context in which generalization-analysis could be useful.
Neither the government, in its brief, nor the court of appeals, in any of its published
opinions, identified the quantity of TV sets that Huddleston could obtain as evidence that
the TV sets were stolen. See Brief for the Government at 37, Huddleston v. United States,
485 U.S. 681 (1988); United States v. Huddleston, 802 F.2d 874, 876, n.5 (1986) (initial
panel decision), vacated on rhr'g., 811 F.2d 974 (1987). The only evidence in the record
before the Court upon which it could have based that assertion is Toney's testimony that:
Q. And did Mr. Huddleston say how many of these T.V.'s he or his group
had to sell?
A. Somehow or another, I got the impression and I could be wrong on the
fact that they were about 3000, you know. But I think upon it later there
might have been something like seven or eight hundred.
I don't know. Somehow it stands in my mind about the 3000, but I really
don't remember how that came about.
Joint Appendix at 25, Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988) (No. 87-6). Further
evidence made it clear that there were other sources from whom Toney could have acquired
information that informed his "impression." Toney had, in fact, purchased the TV sets from a
retail store to whose owner, an attorney named Alphonse Lewis, Leroy Wesby had sold sev-
eral hundred of the TV sets, with Huddleston acting as an agent or broker in both transactions.
See id. at 24-29 (Toney), 43-45 (Huddleston), 71-76 (Lewis).
The relationships between the evidence, Toney's testimony, and the Chief Justice's
claim, that the petitioner indicated he could obtain several thousand more might be sub-
jected to generalization-analysis by someone interested in determining the standards the
Court observes in stating "facts" based upon the record before it. Here, the proposition to
be justified, the probandum, would be "petitioner indicated he could obtain several thou-
sand of these televisions." The propositions and the intermediate inferences upon which
the probandum is based would have to be articulated from Toney's testimony. An articu-
lation of the generalizations necessary to justify those inferences and that probandum
would enable an analyst to frame hypotheses about the standards the Court observes in
stating facts to fit its conclusions that could be tested and refined by analyzing statements
of "fact" in other opinions. See also infra notes 38 and 55.
34. See Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 684.
35. See id.
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the appliances were legitimate."
The government based its theory of relevance upon a generaliza-
tion, which according to the Supreme Court, was:
[T]he televisions were stolen, and proof that petitioner [Hud-
dleston] had engaged in a series of sales of stolen merchandise
from the same suspicious source would be strong evidence that
he was aware that each of the items, including the Memorex
tapes, was stolen.
The Court granted review to determine the standard that a trial
judge should use to determine whether the evidence that the accused
had committed a proffered other crime or act was sufficient to justify the
other crimes or act's admission under Rule 404(b)." The Court rejected
the view that the evidence had to satisfy either a "clear and convincing"
standard or even the lower "preponderance of the evidence" standard.3 9
The Court ruled that the appropriate standard was the standard speci-
fied in Rule 104(b)-whether there was "sufficient evidence to support a
finding by the jury" that the accused had committed the other crime or
36. See id.
37. Id. at 686.
38. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b); Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 685. Here, as elsewhere, the
Court appears to have selected a case to resolve a conflict among the circuits in which the issue
it chose to address was not raised by the parties and did not need to be decided in order to re-
solve the actual question presented. The court of appeals had, on rehearing, affirmed Hud-
dleston's conviction, ruling that the "preponderance of the evidence" standard was the stan-
dard to be applied to similar acts evidence and that the trial judge had not abused his
discretion in finding that the evidence that the TV sets were stolen had satisfied that standard.
U.S. v. Huddleston, 811 F.2d 974, 975-76 (6th Cir. 1987). Huddleston did not challenge that
decision; he petitioned for review, asking the Court to determine whether the court of appeals
had erred in not applying a "clear and convincing" standard as the test for whether evidence
that the accused had committed an uncharged crime was admissible under Rule 404(b). See
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988) (No. 87-6).
The government's brief identified only one Question Presented: "Whether, before admitting
'similar acts' evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), a district court must find that the 'similar
acts' have been proved by clear and convincing evidence." Brief for the United States at I,
Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988) (No. 87-6).
The Court used the case as a vehicle to decide a question that was not raised or
briefed by the parties and that was not necessary to a decision in the particular case-
whether it is permissible to admit "similar act" evidence where there is only evidence
"sufficient to support a finding" that the act was similar. This is not the only evidence case
in which the Court has granted review to answer a question that was not necessary to its
decision in the particular case. See, e.g., Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
Apart from being inconsistent with the Court's announced standards, decisions such
as these have a deceptive effect. By choosing cases that do not squarely present the issue
that the Court intends to resolve, the Court is able to marshal the facts to make the cases
appear to be "easy cases" and thus to camouflage the real problems and avoid the hard is-
sues. The problem identified in note 33 above compounds the problem noted here.
39. Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 687 n.5.
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act.' The Court concluded that the evidence was sufficient under that
standard to support a finding that the TV sets had been stolen because:
In assessing whether the evidence was sufficient to support a
finding that the televisions were stolen, the court here was re-
quired to consider not only the direct evidence on that point-
the low price of the televisions, the large quantity offered for
sale, and petitioner's inability to produce a bill of sale-but also
the evidence concerning petitioner's involvement in the sales of
other stolen merchandise obtained from Wesby, such as the
Memorex tapes and the Amana appliances. Given this evidence,
the jury reasonably could have concluded that the televisions
were stolen, and the trial court therefore properly allowed the
evidence to go to the jury.41
B. The Method Applied
I want to focus upon two aspects of the Court's reasoning here: its
determination that the fact that the tapes and the appliances had in fact
been stolen supported an inference that the TV sets had also been sto-
len, and its determination that the fact that the appliances Huddleston
offered for sale in May had been stolen was evidence that he knew in
April that the tapes had been stolen. An analysis of the generalizations
underlying these determinations illustrates the use of generalization-
analysis in a decided case to focus upon reasoning about the relation-
ships between specific propositions and the kinds of issues that can be
clarified by such an analysis.
First, the question of standpoint: For purposes of this analysis, my
standpoint is that of an academic evidence theorist examining a decided
case to identify the generalizations available or necessary to justify the
Court's conclusions (a) that the fact that the tapes and the appliances
were stolen goods supported an inference that the TV sets were also
stolen goods, and (b) that the fact that Huddleston had sold or offered
to sell the TV sets in February and the appliances in May supported an
inference that Huddleston knew in April that the tapes were stolen. My
objective is to identify and articulate what I see as the generalizations
necessary to justify these inferences and to identify the kinds of issues
that such an articulation makes it possible to address.'2
40. FED. R. EVID. 104(b); Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 685.
41. Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 691 (emphasis added).
42. It is not my intention to provide a comprehensive analysis and critique of the deci-
sion or its significance. Given the standpoint that I have adopted, I have not included other
evidence that might support an inference that Huddleston knew the tapes were stolen, such as
the fact that they wereoffered for sale at a price that was less than their manufacturing cost, or
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Second, specification of the propositions to be justified: Based upon
the standpoint adopted, the case, as the Supreme Court viewed it,
can be reduced to thirty-six propositions. A list of those propositions
is set out in Appendix A. 4 Only two of those propositions are
propositions to be justified in this analysis-propositions 4 and 7.
However, an understanding of the analysis of those propositions will
be facilitated by specifying the ultimate and penultimate probanda
for the offense for which Huddleston was convicted -propositions 1
through 4:
1. In April 1985, Guy Rufus Huddleston ("GRH") possessed a
large quantity of Memorex videocassette tapes (the "tapes")
that had been supplied by Leroy Wesley ("LW") and that had
been stolen in interstate commerce, and GRH knew that the
tapes had been stolen.44
2. In April 1985, GRH possessed a large quantity of tapes that
had been supplied by LW. [Undisputed ("U")]
3. The tapes that LW had supplied to GRH in April 1985 had
been stolen in interstate commerce. [U]
4. In April 1985, GRH knew that the tapes supplied by LW had
been stolen.
Third, specification of the justifying propositions: For purposes of
this analysis, only three of the propositions that the Court thought pro-
vided justification for proposition 4 are important-proposition 3 (set
out above) and propositions 7 and 8:
7. The 12" black and white television sets (the "TV sets") that
LW supplied to GRH in February 1985 had been stolen.
8. The Amana appliances (the "appliances") that LW supplied
to GRH in May 1985 had been stolen. [U]
The claimed inductive relationships among these propositions upon
which the Court's analysis relied are depicted in charted form in the
that the Court thought supported the inference that the TV sets were stolen, such as the price
at which they were sold. For a more comprehensive analysis and critique of the decision, see
Dale A. Nance, Conditional Relevance Reinterpreted, 70 B.U. L. REv. 447,498-505 (1990).
43. Throughout the text that follows, I use the number assigned to each proposition in
the key list that appears in Appendix A.
44. The opinions in the court of appeals and the testimony included in the Joint Appen-
dix in the Supreme Court make it clear that Wesby was a truck driver. See United States v.
Huddleston, 802 F.2d 874,878 (6th Cir. 1986) (Nelson, J., dissenting); Joint Appendix at 48-49,
75-76, Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988) (No. 87-6). Because the Supreme
Court did not report this fact, I do not consider its significance in the text. In the notes that
follow I do, however, identify and discuss some different synthetic-intuitive and context-
specific generalizations that would be significant if additional reported facts, such as this, were
considered. See infra notes 46, 48, and 59.
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chart and keylist set out as Figure 1 below.
HUDDLESTON: AN INDUCTIVE CHART
The Chart
U 3 7 U 8
U3 U8
The Keylist
1. In April 1985, Guy Rufus Huddleston ("GRH") possessed a large quantity
of Memorex videocassette tapes (the "tapes") that had been supplied by
Leroy Wesby ("LW") and that had been stolen in interstate commerce, and
GRH knew that the tapes had been stolen.
2. In April 1985, GRH possessed a large quantity of tapes that had been sup-
plied by LW. [Undisputed ("U")]
3. The tapes that LW had supplied to GRH in April 1985 had been stolen in
interstate commerce. [U]
4. In April 1985, GRH knew that the tapes supplied by LW had been stolen.
7. The 12" black and white television sets (the "TV sets") that LW supplied to
GRH in February 1985 had been stolen.
& The Amana appliances (the "appliances") that LW supplied to GRH in
May 1985 had been stolen. [U]
FIGURE 1
Fourth, an identification and articulation of the generalizations in-
volved: The analysis requires the identification of two sets of generaliza-
tions-those necessary to show that proposition 6 and proposition 8
converge to support proposition 7 and those necessary to show that
propositions 6,7 and 8 converge to support proposition 4.45 Appendix A
also contains a keylist formulating the generalizations, with some variant
articulations, of the kind necessary for the justification of those infer-
ences. Specific generalizations from that list are introduced in text that
follows as they become material.
The claim that the fact that the tapes supplied by Wesby were sto-
len (P5 and P6) and the fact that the Amana appliances supplied Wesby
were stolen (P8) support an inference that the TV sets supplied Wesby
were stolen (P7) invokes a synthetic-intuitive generalization:
45. See ANALYSIS, supra note 6, at 88-89 (for amplification and illustration).
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37. Goods supplied by a supplier of stolen goods are almost cer-
tainly/probably stolen goods.
I have never, to my knowledge, dealt with a supplier of stolen goods,
and my knowledge of how such suppliers act is, at best, anecdotal.
Nonetheless, based upon such anecdotal knowledge and my view of "the
way things are," proposition 37 seems intuitively correct, although I can
think no basis for deciding which quantifier would be appropriate.
In order to appraise my view of the specific arguments made in
Huddleston, the abstract must be converted into a context-specific gen-
eralization, such as:
38. In all/most/many/some instances a quantity of goods [such
as the TV sets], which was supplied by a person who had on two
subsequent occasions within a three-month period supplied
other kinds of goods [such as the tapes and the appliances] that
were in fact stolen goods, is a quantity of goods that was stolen.
The logical relationship of the generalization in the argument that the
TV sets were stolen is depicted in Figure 2 below.






7. The 12" black and white television ("TV sets") sets that LW supplied to
GRH in February 1985 had been stolen. [U]
3+8. The tapes that LW supplied in April 1985 and the appliances that LW
supplied in May 1985 were goods supplied by person who was not in the
business of supplying such goods an
3. The tapes that LW had supplied to GRH in April 1985 had been stolen
in interstate commerce. [U]
8. The Amana appliances (the "appliances") that LW supplied to GRH in
May 1985 had been stolen. [U]
38. In all/most/many/some instances a quantity of goods [such as the TV
sets], which was supplied by a person who had on two subsequent oc-
casions within a three-month period supplied other kinds of goods
[such as the tapes and the appliances] that were in fact stolen goods, is
a quantity of goods that was stolen.
FIGURE 2
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In considering the context-specific version, however, I am not able
to synthesize an intuition that would enable me to decide whether
"many" or "most" or "some" would be the most appropriate quantifier.
If a court took the view that this uncertainty was likely to be shared
among the jurors, then there would be a further improper prejudice, the
risk of confusion or misvaluation, that would need to be considered be-
fore propositions 6 and 8 could be accepted as support for proposition 7.
But that risk is not obvious without an identification and analysis of the
generalization upon which the argument depends.4 6
The argument that the facts that Wesby supplied Huddleston
with stolen TV sets in February (P7) and stolen appliances in May (P)
support an inference that Huddleston knew that the tapes supplied in
April were stolen finds initial support in a synthetic-intuitive generaliza-
tion that might be framed:
39. A person who has, on more than one occasion, offered for
sale large quantities of stolen goods obtained from the same
source is a person who knew/almost certainly knew/probably
knew [or should have known] that the goods obtained from that
source were stolen goods, notwithstanding any contrary assur-
ances to the contrary that the source may have given him. '
Even in this intuitive form, one improper prejudicial effect is apparent:
there is a risk that the decision-maker will convert a moral judgement,
"should have known," into a factual determination, "did know."
The problems multiply when the synthetic-intuitive generalization
necessary to justify the analysis that the Supreme Court adopted is con-
verted into a context-specific generalization because, in the Court's
46. Adding the fact that Wesby was a truck driver would compound the problem for me.
My intuition suggests to me, on the one hand, that interstate truck drivers have more opportu-
nities than most to acquire and dispose of goods stolen in interstate commerce. On the other
hand, my intuition also suggests to me that truck drivers are likely to have more opportunities
than most to acquire bulk quantities of goods of different kinds at liquidation prices from firms
in distress. Were I a juror, I am uncertain how I would resolve this. Were I an advocate in the
case (for the prosecution or the defense), I would be reluctant to permit a truck driver to sit as
a juror unless I had additional information about truck drivers and their opportunities and
about the specific nature of Wesby's work and experience.
47. The judge in the court of appeals who dissented from the initial decision quoted a
different synthetic-intuitive generalization authored by Judge Learned Hand, "thieves are un-
likely to risk repeated transactions with innocent buyers," as support for an inference that a
repeat buyer is likely to know the goods are stolen. Huddleston, 802 F.2d at 881 (quoting
United States v. Brand, 79 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1935). That formulation has intuitive appeal,
but, in the context of this case, it raises more problems than it solves. The application of the
generalization to a specific accused buyer unfairly focuses upon the knowledge of the perhaps
unconvicted and probably uncross-examinable "thief." In the context of Huddleston, it would
require an assumption that Wesby was the "thief' and that truck driver suppliers of stolen
goods would forego dealing with a gullible, but innocent, proven outlet for his goods.
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analysis, the relationships between propositions 6 and 4; 7 and 4; and 8
and 4 were convergent. That is, proposition 6 standing alone would pro-
vide some support for proposition 4, and proposition 7 standing alone
would provide some support for proposition 4, and proposition 8 stand-
ing alone would provide some support for proposition 4. The support
provided by a prior supplying of stolen goods (PT) for an inference of
subsequent knowledge (P,) seems different in kind than the support that
the subsequent supplying of stolen goods (P) could provide for an infer-
ence of knowledge at a prior time (P4). For that reason the identification
and articulation of four context-specific generalizations becomes neces-
sary to the analysis.
The first sets the stage. It is the context-specific generalization that
would have applied without reference to the other lots of stolen goods, a
generalization providing colorable support for proposition 4 based upon
proposition 6 alone:
40. A person [such as GRH] who sells or offers to sell a sig-
nificant quantity of goods '[such as the tapes] that were in fact
stolen goods on behalf of another [such as LW] is a person who
knew/almost certainly knew/probably knew [or should have
known] that the goods were stolen, notwithstanding any repre-
sentations to the contrary his supplier may have made.
The second formulation makes it possible to consider the support
that the TV sets alone (P7) might provide for an inference that Hud-
dleston knew the tapes were stolen (P4):
41. A person [such as GRH] who sells or offers to sell a signifi-
cant quantity of goods [such as the tapes] that were in fact stolen
goods on behalf of another person [such as LW] who had previ-
ously supplied goods of a different kind [such as the TV sets]
that were in fact stolen goods is a person who knew/almost cer-
tainly knew/probably knew [or should have known] that the of-
fered goods were stolen, notwithstanding any representations to
the contrary his supplier may have made.
48. The court of appeals reported that Huddleston was, by trade, a contractor. See Hud-
dleston, 802 F.2d at 875, n.4 (first decision) and 879 (Nelson, J., dissenting). This is another fact
that might have been included in specifying the context-specific generalizations necessary to
support the proposed inference if my adopted standpoint did not limit the material for analysis
to the Supreme Court's opinion, such as:
A person who is not a merchant [such as GRH] who sells or offers to sell at
low prices a significant quantity of goods that were in fact stolen goods on
behalf of a person who is not in the business of supplying goods of that kind
[such as LW] is a person who certainly/almost certainly/probably knows (or
should know) that the goods were stolen, notwithstanding any representa-
tions to the contrary his supplier may have made.
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The third formulation isolates the support that the subsequent sup-
plying of Amana appliances in May (P,) might provide for an inference
that Huddleston had the necessary knowledge when he possessed the
tapes in April:
42. A person [such as GRH] who sells or offers to sell a signifi-
cant quantity of goods [such as the tapes] that were in fact stolen
goods on behalf of another person [such as LW] who subse-
quently supplied goods of a different kind [such as the appli-
ances] that were in fact stolen goods is a person who
knew/almost certainly knew/probably knew [or should have
known] that the offered goods were stolen, notwithstanding any
representations to the contrary his supplier may have made.
And finally, a formulation that enables us to consider the combined
effect of propositions 7 and 8 as support for proposition 4:
43. A person [such as GRH] who sells or offers to sell a signifi-
cant quantity of goods [such as the tapes] that were in fact stolen
goods on behalf of another person [such as LW] who had previ-
ously supplied and who subsequently supplied goods of different
kinds that were in fact stolen goods is a person who knew/almost
certainly knew/probably knew [or should have known] that the
offered goods were stolen, notwithstanding any representations
to the contrary his supplier may have made.
My objective here has been to illustrate a method of analysis by ap-
plying it to two particular claims made by the Supreme Court in Hud-
dleston to demonstrate its uses (and limitations). The analysis might be
extended or broadened, if my standpoint were different. But the fore-
going should suffice to lay a foundation for developing some additional
not so apparent issues the method can bring into focus.
C. Some Conclusions Suggested
Using this method of analyzing generalizations in legal contexts has
an obvious advantage. It requires and enables the analyzer to take facts
more seriously than is possible if the analysis ignores the generalizations
involved in a case or is limited to the generalizations involved in only
their more abstract synthetic-intuitive formulations. For the advocate, it
facilitates the identification and development of arguments challenging
or supporting the specific use to which evidence has been or might be
put. For the academic commentator, the method makes it easier to
identify and appraise issues raised by a decision that are not apparent
from the text. Here I shall content myself with a few illustrations and
qualifications.
The claim that the facts that the tapes Wesby supplied in April and
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that the appliances he supplied in May were stolen support an inference
that the TV sets he had supplied in February were stolen raises several
interesting problems. Given the context, the fact that the government
could not offer persuasive independent evidence that the TV sets were
stolen supports a rival inference. Evidence necessary to establish the
manufacturing costs and the wholesale and liquidation prices for 12"
black and white TV sets in 1985 should have been readily available. The
government was able to trace the tapes and the appliances to their
sources and prove that these goods had been stolen in interstate com-
merce. The fact that the government could not or did not present com-
parable evidence with respect to the TV sets would provide support for
an inference that the TV sets were not stolen.
Two synthetic-intuitive generalization supporting that conclusion
spring to mind:
45. Almost all/most instances in which the government has ac-
cess to suspect goods and knows the source who supplied them
are instances in which the government can reliably determine
whether the goods were stolen.
46. Almost all/most instances in which the government fails to
present, without explanation, evidence that should be readily
available are instances in which the government has determined
the evidence if presented would not support the position that it
seeks to establish.49
In that context, the Court's conclusion that the facts that the tapes and
appliances were stolen could properly be used to support an inference
that the TV sets were stolen seems to provide an incentive to the gov-
ernment to avoid the best evidence principle, when observing that prin-
ciple is inconvenient."
The double-counting problem was apparent without resort to gen-
eralization analysis of the kind undertaken here. Nonetheless, a focus
upon the quantifiers that are appropriate for the applicable context-
specific generalization (P37) should facilitate a discussion of whether the
Court's decision reflects an understanding of the "transivity of doubt"
problem that is inherent in the standard it prescribes. If the tapes and
49. The analysis in the text is confined to the evidence disclosed in the Supreme Court's
opinion, supplemented by notes reporting additional evidence disclosed in the court of ap-
peals' opinions. There is nothing in any of the opinions that suggests that the government was
called upon to justify its failure or inability to present what should have been the best available
evidence.
50. See generally Dale A. Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, 73 IOWA L. REv. 227
(1988) (developing the best evidence principle and the rationale for its application and conse-
quences).
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appliances are necessary (or would themselves be sufficient) to establish
a foundation from which a jury might find that it is more probable than
not the TV sets were stolen, what, if any, additional support can that
conclusion provide for an inference that it is beyond reasonable doubt
that Huddleston knew the tapes were stolen?
The context-specific generalization necessary to justify an inference
that the fact that the appliances supplied in May were stolen increases
the likelihood that Huddleston was aware in April that the tapes were
stolen (P,2) forces into prominence a temporal issue that is not apparent
from the synthetic-intuitive formulation (P,,). The justification for infer-
ring that the prior transaction supports an inference in the subsequent
transaction (i.e., P-P 4) seems intuitively sound. The soundness of a
justification for reasoning that the subsequent transaction supports an
inference concerning the former transaction (i.e., P8-P,) is not appar-
ent."'
One significant benefit from the application of generalization-
analysis to evidence decisions such as Huddleston is that it creates a dif-
ferent lens through which to examine a part of the Supreme Court's evi-
dence jurisprudence that has not received the attention it merits. The
clear thrust of the Supreme Court's decisions under the Federal Rules of
Evidence has been to expand the discretion of the trial judge and to limit
the possibility of meaningful review of the exercise of that discretion. In
Huddleston, for example, the trial judge was required to decide whether
the claimed evidence of similar acts had a legitimate, non-propensity,
probative value with respect to Huddleston's knowledge, whether the
evidence was sufficient to establish the necessary similarity of one of
those acts (i.e., that the TV sets were stolen), and whether the improper
prejudicial effects (propensity and other) likely to follow from admitting
the evidence substantially outweighed its legitimate probative value with
respect to the state of Huddleston's knowledge when he dealt with the
tapes. After Huddleston, a trial judge's decision to admit such evidence
could be reversed only if she abused her discretion and if the reviewing
court found that abuse prejudiced a substantial right of the defendant.
Only once has the Supreme Court ruled that a trial judge had abused his
discretion in determining that the improper prejudice did not substan-
tially outweigh the probative value of an item of proffered evidence, and
the practical significance of that decision is not yet apparent.
51. The justification might seem more apparent if Judge Hand's formulation of the syn-
thetic-intuitive generalization were accepted. The proposition justified would, however, be a
different and almost irrelevant proposition-i.e., that Wesby believed that Huddleston knew
the goods were stolen. See supra note 47.
52. See generally Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997) (5-4 decision) (holding
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The kind of analysis that this new lens facilitates can be illustrated
by examining the potential improper prejudice and the legitimate proba-
tive value of the similar acts evidence admitted in Huddleston in light of
the generalization-analysis presented above. In my view, such analysis
makes it possible to develop a more rigorous calculus for use in deciding
whether or to what extent the improper prejudicial effects of proffered
evidence outweigh its legitimate probative value. 3
For example, the fact that the government did not present any di-
rect evidence, as that term is customarily used, that the TV sets were
stolen or any explanation for its failure to do so could be marshaled to
support and inference that the TV sets were not stolen, if the generali-
zations expressed in propositions 45 and 46 were accepted. 4
45. Almost all/most instances in which the government has ac-
cess to suspect goods and knows the source who supplied them
are instances in which the government can reliably determine
whether the goods were stolen.
46. Almost all/most instances in which the government fails to
present, without explanation, evidence that should be readily
available are instances in which the government has determined
the evidence if presented would not support the position that it
seeks to establish.
In that analysis, what the Supreme Court characterized as "direct evi-
that the trial judge abused his discretion in rejecting defendant's offer to stipulate to prior con-
viction element of offense and admitting full record of prior judgment of conviction, when
purpose of evidence was solely to prove prior felony conviction element of offense of posses-
sion of firearm by a felon).
53. The feasibility and utility of conducting an analysis using such a calculus is a function
of standpoint. No advocate could afford to devote the kind of time that would be necessary to
conduct the analysis and apply the calculus described here on every aspect of a case to be tried.
An advocate could, however, perform this kind of analysis on specific evidentiary aspects cru-
cial to her theory of the case. No judge would or should devote the time necessary for such an
analysis, nor would or should a jury. Each would and should, in appropriate circumstances,
consider the arguments that the lawyer could develop through such an analysis. See Terence J.
Anderson, Refocusing the New Evidence Scholarship, 13 CARDOzo L. REv. 783, 783-87
(1991) (developing the role of atomistic analysis in litigation contexts). The time and effort
necessary to conduct such an analysis can and should be invested, again in appropriate circum-
stances, such as those present in Huddleston, by appellate advocates and courts and by aca-
demic theorists commenting on the resulting decisions.
54. An inference that the TV sets were not stolen would converge with Huddleston's
testimony (Ps) to provide additional support for his claim that he believed the tapes were le-
gitimate (P,-P). Such inference finds further support in the testimony of Alphonse Lewis,
the attorney/store-owner who actually purchased the TV sets from Wesby. See Jt. App. at 71-
76. That evidence, if believed, would also support an inference that Huddleston had good rea-
son, based upon the TV set transaction, to believe that Wesby was not a supplier of stolen
goods, providing still further support for P6-4P,.
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dence"-the low price, the large quantity, and the lack of a bill of sale'-
could have diminished the inference that the TV sets were not stolen,
but was hardly sufficient to support an inference that they were stolen.
There was no reported evidentiary foundation to establish that $28 was
"low" as a wholesale or liquidation price for 12" black and white TV sets
in 1985; apparently, this was a fact that the courts assumed a jury could
consider without evidence. The force of an inference based upon Hud-
dleston's failure to produce a bill of sale also seems weak.56  If that
analysis is accepted, then the facts that the tapes and the appliances were
stolen were necessary predicates for the Court's conclusion that the evi-
dence was sufficient to support a finding by the trial judge that the jury
could find that it was more probable than not that the TV sets had been
stolen.
That analysis also makes it possible to develop a more rigorous
analysis of evidence that Huddleston had offered to sell stolen appli-
ances that were supplied Wesby. The improper prejudice from this evi-
dence is clear. An FBI agent testified that Huddleston, in May, had of-
fered to sell appliances that were demonstrably stolen in interstate
commerce. 7 This evidence has an improper propensity effect and cre-
ates a serious improper potential for a non-unanimous verdict; i.e., that
jurors who were uncertain about the tapes would vote to convict be-
cause they either believed that Huddleston was a dealer in stolen goods
or concluded he must have known by May that the appliances were sto-
len and thus deserved to punished in any event.
Moreover, the likelihood that jurors would use the undisputed fact
that the tapes Huddleston possessed in April were stolen to support an
inference that he must have known by May that Wesby was a supplier of
stolen goods seems far higher than the likelihood that they would view
the fact that the May appliances were stolen as evidence that Hud-
dleston knew that the tapes he possessed in April were stolen. This ap-
parent risk of confusion and misvaluation is compounded by suggesting
that jurors should be able to use the fact that the May appliances were
stolen as evidence that the February TV sets were stolen so that they
could use the likelihood that the February TV sets were stolen as evi-
55. See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691 (1988); see also notes 33 above
and 56 below.
56. The Court's assertion does not reflect the context established by the record before it.
Lewis testified that he had in fact obtained a bill of sale. Although Lewis' credibility was surely
a matter for the jury, it appears clear that Huddleston was only a broker or agent and not a
principal in Lewis' purchase of TV sets from Wesby. See supra note 33 and references to Joint
Appendix reported there.
57. See Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 684.
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dence that Huddleston knew the April tapes were stolen.
This kind of more detailed analysis poses at least two questions that
merit study. First, is it possible to establish meaningful standards to
guide or regulate a trial judge's exercise of discretion in deciding
whether and to what degree the improper prejudicial effects outweigh
the legitimate probative value of proffered evidence? The second is less
obvious. Decisions by a trial judge about the relevance, legitimate pro-
bative value, and improper effects of challenged evidence will necessar-
ily be affected and often governed by the synthetic-intuitive generaliza-
tions of that judge and her translation and application of those
generalizations in the context of the particular case. In that view, it is
fair to ask whether and to what extent does the largely unreviewable
discretion conferred on the trial judge undermine the right of a citizen to
have a jury of her peers apply their generalizations, in theory a cross-
section of prevalent generalizations held by the community, in deciding
and resolving the disputed facts in her case. It was not my purpose here
to develop the arguments that bear upon issues such as these; instead,
my goal has been to demonstrate that generalization-analysis is a useful
vehicle for identifying and clarifying issues such as these and for devel-
oping and critiquing arguments that bear upon their resolution.
III. CONCLUDING NOTES
This essay is the first in a planned series of explorations of the uses
and limitations of generalizations and generalization-analysis in different
contexts. Here, I have attempted to establish a definitional foundation
and an analytic protocol with an illustration of how and to what effect
the foundation and protocol might be employed in a particular context,
the context of analyzing and critiquing the reasoning in an evidence
opinion issued by the United States Supreme Court. My primary pur-
pose has been to illustrate the method of analysis and its application,
rather than to apply the method and develop the results. It should be
clear that, had I applied the method to Huddleston to develop fully the
arguments suggested above, the structure of this essay would have been
different. I would have developed the arguments and used specific gen-
eralizations and evidential and inferential propositions only as they illus-
trated or amplified the argument being presented.
In future essays, I expect to explore the application of the method
in other contexts and from other standpoints. For example, in my view
the verdict in the O.J. Simpson case" can be rationally justified by iden-
58. People v. Simpson, No. BA0987211, 1995 WL 704381 (unreported, Los Angeles Sup.
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tifying generalizations about police conduct that the jurors in that case
were likely to have held and applying those generalizations to the con-
text established by the evidence in that case. The application of those
synthetic-intuitive generalizations has, in my view, significance for other
cases and contexts that has not been adequately recognized. So, too, I
believe that the method makes it possible to identify the roles that fac-
tors such as ethnicity, gender, community, etc. may play in decision
making by identifying differences in the experience-based and belief
generalizations produced by those factors. I hope that these further ex-
plorations will facilitate the development of a more general theory of
generalizations and more refined methods of generalization-analysis.
APPENDIX A
HUDDLESTON KEYLIST
1. In April 1985, Guy Rufus Huddleston ("GRH") possessed a
large quantity of Memorex videocassette tapes (the "tapes") that had
been supplied by Leroy Wesby ("LW") and that had been stolen in in-
terstate commerce, and GRH knew that the tapes had been stolen.
2. In April 1985, GRH possessed a large quantity of tapes that had
been supplied by LW. [Undisputed ("U")]
3. The tapes that LW had supplied to GRH April 1985 had been
stolen in interstate commerce. [U]
4. In April 1985, GRH knew that the tapes supplied by LW had
been stolen.
5. The tapes that GRH possessed had been supplied by Leroy
Wesby ("LW") in April 1985. [U]
6. The tapes that LW supplied to GRH in April 1985 had been
stolen.
7. The 12" black and white television sets (the "TV sets") that LW
supplied to GRH in February 1985 had been stolen. [U]
8. The Amana appliances (the "appliances") that LW supplied to
GRH in May 1985 had been stolen. [U]
9. GRH did not know that the tapes supplied by LW had been
stolen.
10. GRH believed, at the time he possessed the tapes, that LW was
supplying him with lawfully obtained goods.
11. In February 1985, LW possessed a large quantity of the TV sets.
[U]
Ct., Ito J., Oct. 3, 1995).
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12. GRH sold 38 of the TV sets to a retailer for $28 per set. [U]
13. GRH did not produce a bill of sale for the TV sets he sold. [U]
14. GRH testified that LW told him that the TV sets were legiti-
mate. [U]
15. LW told GRH that the TV sets were legitimate.
16. GRH testified that he believe LW when he told GRH that the
TV sets were legitimate. [U]
17. GRH believed that the TV sets were legitimate.
18. GRH did not know that the TV sets had been stolen.
19. In April 1985, LW possessed a truckload of the tapes. [U]
20. The tapes had, in fact, been stolen. [U]
21. LW offered to pay GRH a commission on any of the tapes that
GRH sold. [U]
22. GRH sold 5000 of the tapes. [U]
23. GRH testified that LW told him that the tapes were legitimate.
[U]
24. LW told GRH that the tapes were legitimate.
25. GRH testified that he believe LW when he told GRH that the
tapes were legitimate. [U]
26. GRH believed that the tapes were legitimate.
27. GRH did not know that the tapes had been stolen.
28. In May 1985, LW possessed a substantial quantity of the appli-
ances. [U]
29. The appliances had, in fact, been stolen. [U]
30. LW offered to pay GRH a commission on any of the appliances
that he sold. [U]
31. GRH agreed to sell and Robert Nelson, an FBI undercover
agent, agreed to buy a large quantity of the appliances for $8000. [U]
32. GRH testified that LW told him that the appliances were le-
gitimate. [U]
33. LW told GRH that the appliances were legitimate.
34. GRH testified that he believed LW when he told GRH that the
appliances were legitimate. [U]
35. GRH believed that the appliances were legitimate.
36. GRH did not know that the appliances had been stolen.
GENERALIZATIONS
37. Goods supplied by a supplier of stolen goods are almost cer-
tainly/probably stolen goods.
38. In all/most/many/some instances a quantity of goods [such the
TV sets], which was supplied by a person who had on two subsequent
occasions within a three-month period supplied other kinds of goods
1999]
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[such as the tapes and the Amana appliances] that were in fact stolen
goods, is a quantity of goods that was stolen. 9
39. A person who has, on more than one occasion, offered for sale
large quantities of stolen goods obtained from the same source is a per-
son who knew/almost certainly knew/probably knew [or should have
known] that the goods obtained from that source were stolen goods,
notwithstanding any assurances to the contrary the source may have
made.
40. A person [such as GRH] who sells or offers to sell a significant
quantity of goods [such as the tapes] that were in fact stolen goods on
behalf of another person [such as LW] is a person who knew/almost cer-
tainly knew/probably knew [or should have known] that the goods were
stolen, notwithstanding any assurances to the contrary his supplier may
have made.
41. A person [such as GRH] who sells or offers to sell at low prices
a significant quantity of goods [such as the tapes] that were in fact stolen
goods on behalf of another person [such as LW] who had previously
supplied goods of a different kind [such as the TV sets] that.were in fact
stolen goods is a person who knew/almost certainly knew/probably knew
[or should have known] that the offered goods were stolen, notwith-
standing any assurances to the contrary his supplier may have made.
42. A person [such as GRH] who sells or offers to sell at low prices
a significant quantity of goods [such as the tapes] that were in fact stolen
goods on behalf of another person [such as LW] who subsequently sup-
plied goods of a different kind [such as the appliances] that were in fact
stolen goods is a person who knew/almost certainly knew/probably knew
[or should have known] that the offered goods were stolen, notwith-
standing any assurances to the contrary his supplier may have made.
43. A person [such as GRH] who sells or offers to sell at low prices
a significant quantity of goods [such as the tapes] that were in fact stolen
goods on behalf of another person [such as LW] who had previously
supplied and who subsequently supplied goods of a different kind that
were in fact stolen goods is a person who certainly/almost cer-
tainly/probably knew [or should have known] that the offered goods
were stolen, notwithstanding any assurances to the contrary his supplier
may have made.
59. Context-specific generalizations 38 through 43 would each be more contextually spe-
cific if the standpoint of the analyst were the decisions of the court of appeals. For example,
these propositions could be formulated to take account of the fact LW was a truck driver and
was not a person in the business of supplying goods such as TV sets, tapes, or appliances and
that GRH was a local contractor and was not a merchant with respect to goods of the LW sup-
plied.
[Vol.40:455480
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44. A person who-has once/twice/thrice received stolen goods from
the same source is a person knew/almost certainly knew/probably knew
[or should have known] that the goods received were stolen goods, not-
withstanding any assurances the supplier may have given him.
45. Almost all/most instances in which the government has access
to suspect goods and knows the source who supplied them are instances
in which the government can reliably determine whether the goods were
stolen.
46. Almost all/most instances in which the government fails to pre-
sent, without explanation, evidence that should be readily available are
instances in which the government has determined the evidence if pre-
sented would not support the position that it seeks to establish.
